

IMA 7th World Congress, Galway'19
SECURE 2019, Warsaw, Poland

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
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- _(ツ)_/ -

/** What are Botnets? **/

- **Botnet** is a network of compromised computers (zombies / bots) under the control of a remote attacker (bot master)
- Bots were originally developed as a useful tool - virtual agents helping the operators of IRC channels to monitor network traffic
- **Scrumpling** - stealing computing resources as a result of a system being joined to a botnet
- Botnets are significant contributors to the malicious & criminal activities on the Internet today (spamming, hosting illegal materials, mining $\text{\$}$, DDoS attacks, stealing sensitive data, penetrating corporate networks or strategic country infrastructures, and thus posing a national security threat).
- They form an [underground network whose size & scope is not fully known](#)


/** What are botnets? **/



```
/* bot master */  
// - \\  
^ ^  
0 0  
~  
\ o *My password is ...*!  
| |
```




/* C&Cs */



- // spam email attachment
- // infected media (e.g. USB stick)
- // corrupted HTML website
- // software vulnerabilities
- // user naivety
- // social engineering

/** What are botnets? **/


/* AV */



/* bot master */



/* C&Cs */





```
// household & corporate (different size distributions, user  
    activity & behaviours, admins & maintenance schedules)  
// desktop, laptop (can change networks), server (always on)  
// different OS (types: Windows, MacOS, Linux; versions; releases)  
// antivirus (releases) or not (source of data: AV benchmarks)  
// user types (at home only, home & office, travelling laptop)
```

/** What are botnets? **/


/* bot master */



/* C&Cs */



// user & admin time schedules




/* admin */


6 6 // maintenance
~ // system updates

(source of data:
e.g. ad click times)


/* Microsimulation of a botnet */ Example of a desktop user schedule




`/* Microsimulation of a botnet */`
Example of a laptop user schedule




/** What are botnets? /**




/* Microsimulation of a botnet */ Infection proces




/** What are botnets? **/




/* Microsimulation of a botnet */ Bot state evolution



/** What are botnets? **/




/** What are botnets? **/




// not 100% effective

/* Microsimulation of a botnet */ Antivirus program operation




/* Microsimulation of a botnet */ Host maintenance by sysadmin




/** What are botnets? **/



/* Microsimulation of a botnet */ Host activity cycle




/* Microsimulation of a botnet */ Object model




/* Microsimulation of a botnet */

Data flow




/* Microsimulation of a botnet */ Simulation timeline



/** What are botnets? **/




Structure of Polish Internet




	nbr of networks	nbr of desktops	nbr of servers
household	10,453,728	1	0
micro-enterprise	2,073,600	2	0
small enterprise	52,366	21	0
medium enterprise	14,881	105	0
large enterprise	3,614	858	27
laptops	824,299	-	-

(Data source: Polish Office for Statistics, GUS)

/** Microsimulation of a botnet in PL network: growth & stabilisation ***/



/** Fighting botnets **/



/***** Virut *****/

- # malware botnet operating at least since 2006
- # **the 5th-most widespread threat to the Internet**, responsible for **5.5%** of computer infections (*Kaspersky Security Bulletin 2012*):
 - * 2012: 300,000 computers in Egypt, Pakistan, India (*Symantec*)
 - * 2013: 890,000 IP addresses in Poland (*CERT Polska*)
- # **cybercrime activity**: DDoS attacks, spam, fraud, data theft, and pay-per-install activities
- # **spreads via executable file** infection (email attachments, infected USB sticks and other media) and more, recently, via compromised HTML files (vulnerable browsers)
- # **disrupted by NASK in January 2013**: takeover of 23 Virut C&Cs in attempt to shut it down -> [sinkholes](#) (**key information about botnet dynamics**)
- # can't be shut down completely, as some C&Cs are located at ".ru" domains, i.e. outside the reach of the Polish NASK. There's a threat that it will reestablish itself (Virut's alternate backup hosts mechanism)

/* Sinkhole */

Eavesdrops messages sent by bots to C&C together with bots' diagnostics (host ID, network type, IP, etc.)

```
{
  "origin": "sinkhole",
  "restriction": "need-to-know",
  "confidence": "high",
  "name": "virut",
  "category": "bots",
  "proto": "tcp",
  "time": "2018-04-18T11:59:59Z",
  "modified": "2018-04-18T12:00:29Z",
  "until": "2018-04-18T16:13:00Z",
  "source": "cert-pl.sinkhole",
  "address": [
    {
      "cc": "CN",
      "ip": "VV.XXX.YYY.ZZZ",
      "asn": 4134
    }
  ],
  "dport": 80,
  "rid":
  "45997e6910b19e38e443babdbd37a3d0",
  "sport": 1592,
  "dip": "AAA.BBB.CCC.DDD",
  "id":
  "e75c853670f6391b36c64e3c272848e9",
  "count": 43
}
```


PROBLEM: one IP can be assigned to multiple hosts

/* How many hosts in Polish computer network are infected? */



/* Exploratory data analysis */


Number of recorded messages per day



Algeria, Nigeria, South Africa, Ghana...

/* Exploratory data analysis */

Number of recorded messages per world region per hour (13-16 Mar 19)



>> Messages from all regions peak every 24h at midnight GMT

>> We assume botnet messaging frequency is 24h by wall clock time

EDA can help characterise botnet regime & detect changes

Our task: based on sinkhole data, estimate the size and structure of Virut botnet in Polish Internet

We know:

- # *User behaviour* (studies and data, e.g. times of ad clicks)
- # *Polish Internet structure* (government statistics, etc.)
- # *AV efficiency* (available benchmarks)
- # *Some botnet parameters:*
 - # *typical botnet behaviours* (laboratory test)
 - # **data from sinkhole**

We can build (we already did!): efficient **botnet microsimulation**

In other words, what parameters of our botnet microsimulation generate a data stream similar to Virut messages eavesdropped at the sinkhole?


(prediction: MICROSIMULATIONS -> RESULTS)

discovery: RESULTS & DATA -> MICROSIMULATION PARAMETERS

Our task: based on sinkhole data, estimate the size and structure of Virut botnet in Polish Internet

Sinkhole data


Daily number of observed IPs
from Poland



/* Large (GBs) stream of data
from several years - and coming*/

Polish Internet

Source: GUS



1:10

How many hosts in Polish network are infected?


```
/* Microsimulation of a botnet  
infecting the Polish network */  
(vs AV and OS new releases)
```

Watch the movie at
<https://youtu.be/yktpbrCjuy4>

Network type:

Corporate

Household

Bot state:

Setting up

Working

Propagating

Dormant

ON

OFF


How to guess what parameters of our microsimulation of a botnet in Polish Internet will generate a data stream similar to real-world Virut messages eavesdropped at the sinkhole?

Solution: search the whole space of parameters and choose a set of their values which generates results similar to real-world data.

Problem: the space of those parameters is very high-dimensional and “complicated”. Finding those parameters using standard methods is unfeasible given nowadays computational powers.

That's why we will use Bayesian optimisation!

/* Bayesian optimisation */



- **Function f** (microsimulation calibration error) is computed slowly. The best we can do is to find its **statistical model \mathcal{M}** based on small number of samples.
- We sample single points from f and fit \mathcal{M} to it, until we achieve a satisfying approximation (**credible interval**): a heuristic called **acquisition function** tells us where to sample to improve the result (*exploitation*); sometimes we sample randomly to avoid getting stuck in a local minimum (*exploration*)
- We obtain a Bayesian model of the function based on observed data

/* Bayesian optimisation */

We want to solve

$$\mathbf{x}^* = \arg \min_{\mathbf{x} \in X} f(\mathbf{x})$$

where f is the error between microsimulation results and data.

Parameter space X is high-dimensional and complicated (discrete & continuous parameters)


Computing f is slow

f is non-smooth -> large system simulation needed

Traditional optimisation algorithms fail

Bayesian optimisation can help!

/* Bayesian optimisation */



Build a statistical model \mathcal{M} of f based on the data $D_n = \{(\mathbf{x}_i, f(\mathbf{x}_i)), i=1, \dots, n\}$ observed so far

Using the acquisition function α , choose the next sampling point $\mathbf{x}_{n+1} = \arg \max_{\mathbf{x} \in X} [\alpha(\mathbf{x}, D_n)]$

Compute a new value $y_{n+1} = f(\mathbf{x}_{n+1})$ and update the data $D_{n+1} = (D_n, (\mathbf{x}_{n+1}, y_{n+1}))$

Update model \mathcal{M} using D_{n+1}

Repeat until convergence


/* Microsimulation structure summary */

Infection

- infection vector: email with attached dropper
 - defence: antispam filter →
antivirus heuristics → user caution
- infection: user opens the email and clicks on the attachment → payload
 - defence: antivirus signature, safe OS

(risks of opening the email and the attachment decrease in time)

- after the payload downloads and installs itself, the host joins the botnet
- botmaster can update the payload version to bypass the AV defences (signature)



Botnet


- sends spam with droppers (botnet campaign)
- periodically contacts C&C, reporting its work or requesting new instructions:
PROPAGATING, WORKING, DORMANT

Removing the infection and patching security holes


- installing and regularly updating AV, performing regular scans of the hosts
- types, versions and releases of OS's regularly updated by system admins

/* Microsimulation structure summary */

- One **ISP** and faultless **Internet connection**
- **Types of networks / user environments:**
 - HOME (dynamic IP)
 - OFFICE (static IP)
- **Hosts** (different risks of infection)
 - „desktop“: DESKTOP, SERVER (no risk)
 - „mobile“: LAPTOP
- **Users** have different schedules of using home and office computers; some computers are shared (e.g. by household members) or moved between office and home networks (laptops).
- Every network has its **administrator**. Static hosts in a network share the same system administrator. Laptop users act as their sysadmins.
- **Email accounts** have many providers (one provider in an office network). Providers can't filter out all spam. Each user has one or two email accounts (personal and professional - if employed) .



/* Parameters of Virut in Polish network */ Mictosimulation and Bayesian optimisation results



- Number of emails with droppers sent by C&C to Polish Internet hosts during an 11-day botnet promotion campaign: **0.79/s**

- Estimated botnet size in April 2014: **2320**

Mind that this result is valid only for Virut as it evolved in according to the date – drawing general conclusions about botnet size and parameters based on a single simulation result is incorrect.

/**/** Summary /**/**/

- # We created tools for microsimulations of realistic country-wide computer networks and their infections: <https://github.com/rilwen/botnet>
- # We successfully employed Bayesian optimisation methods to discover the parameters of a botnet based on real-world data
- # Using the above we can perform quantitative estimation of cybersecurity threats and design effective interventions
- # Case study: discovering the size and other parameters of Virut botnet in Polish computer network based on sinkhole data - this result doesn't generalise to other instances of Virut or other botnets
- # Modelling cybersecurity threats can be improved by providing more data and detailed information: behavioural studies on user practices, structure of computer networks, efficiency of defences, etc.

7h4nk u 4 yr 4773nt10n

